Suggested Citation: Agliardi, Elettra; Sereno, Luigi (2011) : The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet-Brownian uncertainty, Quaderni -Working Paper DSE, No. 725, Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Introduction
The choice of the appropriate policy instrument to control pollution and reduce environmental degradation caused by human activities has become a major concern in the public debate in the last decades. It is often indicated as a key factor to implement a more sustainable development worldwide. Environmental policy instruments are tools used by governments in order to prevent, reduce or mitigate harmful e¤ects on terrestrial and marine ecosystems of accumulating greenhouse gases 1 . Examples of environmental policy instruments include: 1) tradable emissions permits (also known as cap and trade) and environmental taxes (also referred to as market-based instruments); 2) quotas, targets for cutting emissions and commands (also referred to as command-and-control instruments).
Market-based instruments, such as tradable permits of pollutants and environmental taxes, are rising up in the EU agenda. They aim to bring the environmental and health costs of economic activities into market prices and set a price on the use of natural resources like air, water and soil. Recent examples are the EU emission trading scheme and harmonized environmental taxation such as the Taxation of Energy Products Directive and the "Eurovignette" Directive for freight transport. Command-and-control instruments rely on prescribing rules and standards and using sanctions to enforce compliance with them. Command-and-control regulation requires polluters to meet speci…c emission-reduction targets and often requires the installation and use of speci…c types of equipment to reduce emissions 2 . An example is the Kyoto protocol on global warming. The major feature of the Kyoto protocol is that it sets binding targets for 39 industrialized countries and the European Union (i.e. the Annex I parties) for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Emission quotas (also known as "assigned amounts") were agreed by each participating Annex 1 country, with the intention of reducing their average emissions during 2008-2012 to about 5 percent below 1990 levels 3 .
As a consequence of a growing interest in the use of di¤erent types of policy instruments to control pollution, a large number of articles have been published in the environmental economics literature with the intent to investigate the rel- 1 The principal greenhouse gases that enter the atmosphere because of human activities are: carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 2 O), sulphur hexa ‡uoride (SF 6 ), hydro ‡uorocarbons (HFCs) and per ‡uorocarbons (PFCs), among many others. See: http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/index.html. 2 Source: European Environment Agency: http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/policy/aboutpolicy-instruments. 3 The Kyoto protocol was initially adopted on 11 December 1997 in Kyoto and entered into force on 16 February 2005 . Under the Kyoto Protocol, only the Annex I countries have committed themselves to national or joint reduction targets that range from a joint reduction of 8% for the European Union and other (central and eastern) European countries, to 7% for the United States, 6% for Japan, Canada, Hungary and Poland and 0% for New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine; moreover, 8% for Australia and 10% for Iceland. The United States is the only industrialized nation under Annex I that has not rati…ed the treaty and therefore is not bound by it. See the UN Climate Change web: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php , for further information ative merits of price versus quantity instruments 4 to achieve reduction of greenhouse gases emissions. Weitzman (1974) initiated a discussion about the relative e¢ ciency of alternative environmental policies in a simple analytical model characterized by uncertainty, second-best policy alternatives, and costly policy adjustments. The main implication for policy-makers is that taxes are more e¢ cient when marginal bene…ts are relatively ‡at and quantity mechanisms are more e¢ cient when bene…ts are relatively steep. Newell and Pizer (2003) con-…rm this result and show that taxes often generates the expected net bene…ts of quantity instruments when correlation of cost shocks across time, discounting, stock decay, and the rate of bene…ts growth are included. Hoel and Karp (2002) compare the e¤ects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement cost and environmental damage depends on a stock of pollutant. They …nd that taxes tend to dominate quotas and this e¤ect is more pronounced for multiplicative uncertainty . Although the so far cited papers account for uncertainty, they do not consider irreversibility 5 . Xepapadeas (2001) studies the behaviour of polluting …rms regarding the expansion of abatement capital and location decisions in the presence of emission taxes, tradable permits and subsidies for the abatement investment under irreversibility. Insley (2003) studies the decision of an electric power utility regarding the abatement of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions by installing a scrubber, assuming that SO 2 permit prices are stochastic and the construction process includes "time-to-build". Van Soest (2005) analyzes the impact of emission taxes and quotas on the timing of adoption of energy-saving technologies under irreversibility and stochastic arrival rate of the new technologies, and shows that: (i) increased environmental stringency (measured in tax and its equivalent in terms of quota) does not necessarily induce early adoption, and (ii) there is no unambiguous ranking of policy instruments in terms of the length of the adoption lag. Wirl (2006) investigates the implications of two di¤erent kind of irreversibilities (i.e. of CO 2 emissions and of stopping) on the optimal intertemporal accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere under uncertainty. He …nds that an irreversible stopping of greenhouse gas emissions is never optimal and yields in the real option framework a less conservative emission policy, i.e. a later stopping, in comparison with the possibility to suspend emissions without sacri…cing future fossil fuel uses. He then compares the e¤ects of emission taxes and quantities on the optimal timing for policy adoption and shows that both policy instruments are equivalent in such a framework. Pindyck (2000) investigates how irreversibility and uncertainty in ‡uence the timing of policy planning and adoption. Pindyck (2002) generalizes Pindyck (2000) including two stochastic state variables: one captures uncertainty over environmental change (i.e., ecological uncertainty), and the other uncertainty over the social costs of environmental damage (i.e., economic uncertainty). While Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 consider the optimal timing for a single environmental policy adoption, Goto et al. (2009) consider the choice of two alternative environmental policies under uncertainty. They do not discriminate between price and quantity mechanisms as other papers do, but simply index the two policies by 1 and 2 and …nd their ranking. The problem of the timing of policy intervention is also studied by Conrad (1997 Conrad ( , 2000 , Saphores and Carr (2000) and Nishide and Ohyama (2009) .
Our paper is about the optimal timing of a new environmental policy in a framework where production causes pollution, …rms are regulated either by environmental taxes or non-tradable quotas and the regulator is ambiguous over the economic e¤ects of the policies 6 . In contrast to the prior literature we endogenously take into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. In this context, the level of emissions is determined by solving the …rm's pro…t maximization decisions under taxes and …xed quotas as in van Soest (2005) . The regulator solves an optimal stopping problem in order to decide about the timing and ranking of the two policies. First, in Section 3 we assume that the future evolution of the stock of pollutant is deterministic, there is only uncertainty over the future economic net bene…ts of policy adoption and obtain a closed form solution for the thresholds. Next, in Section 4, we assume that there are both ecological uncertainty and ambiguity on the future costs and bene…ts over adopting environmental policies. As Asano (2010) emphasizes, the economic costs of policies aiming at reducing pollutants are not predictable and the perceived ambiguity of the government towards them may a¤ect adoption timing in a non trivial way. Our main results are that (i) the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under …xed quota, even in this setting, and (ii) depending on the regulator's attitude towards ambiguity, uncertainty may increase or decrease the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policies.
Our model di¤ers from the previous literature in various aspects. First, we extend and generalize the continuous-time model of environmental policy adoption in Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 to the case of two alternative environmental policy instruments. In contrast to Goto et al. (2009) , who study the decision to implement two unspeci…ed alternative environmental policies under economic uncertainty, we investigate the e¤ects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions in a real option framework under ecological uncertainty and economic ambiguity. Second, in our paper ambiguity is modelled through Choquet-Brownian motions, rather that relying on the multiple-prior preferences which is based on the maximin criterion (see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Chen and Epstein, 2002) , as has been done so far in the literature dealing with ambiguity and real options. A small number of papers have recently come out introducing ambiguity into real options (Miao and Wang, 2009; Trojanowska and Kort, 2007; Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007; Asano, 2010) , although they are based on the maximin criterion, or the worst case scenario, and show that the impact of ambiguity on valuation and timing is often equivocal. Our approach employing Choquet-Brownian motions follows Kast and Lapied (2008) , which di¤ers from the literature so far, thereby avoiding limits inherent to the maximin criterion. In contrast to Asano (2010) , who …nds that an increase in ambiguity decreases the optimal timing of the environmental policy, we …nd that an ambiguity averse environmental regulator will delay the adoption of the new policies, while an ambiguity lover regulator will adopt them earlier than if neutral ambiguous. Third, di¤erently from van Soest (2005) who analyzes the impact of taxes and quotas on the timing of …rm investment decisions with respect to energy saving technologies, we investigate the environmental regulator's decision about the timing and ranking of the two environmental policies and also illustrate the e¤ects of a change in attitude towards ambiguity on the value and timing of the two policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 solves the optimal stopping problem of the environmental regulator and …nds the ranking of the two environmental policies when the stock of pollutant evolves deterministically and there is uncertainty over the future economic net bene…ts of policy adoption (Propositions 1 and 2). Section 4 introduces both ecological uncertainty and economic ambiguity and contains the most comprehensive result (Proposition 3). Numerical results are presented in Section 5. In particular, a detailed sensitivity analysis is shown as to deepen our understanding of the e¤ects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
We present a simple partial-equilibrium model to illustrate our arguments. A competitive industry consists of identical …rms producing a homogeneous product. Output generates as a by-product environmental damages on society due to some externality. Let us consider a representative …rm producing q units of output at each instant of time according to the simple production function 7 :
where E is the energy used as an input in the production process, a is the constant output elasticity, 0 < a < 1, and is the parameter of energy e¢ ciency. Let p be the …xed price of output and z the …xed unit cost of energy. The production of output generates pollutant emissions. Let M t be a state variable denoting the stock of environmental pollutants, e.g. the average concentration of CO 2 or HFCs in the atmosphere. Let t be a ‡ow variable that controls M t : Emissions are assumed to be determined by the function: t = q t ; where q t is the amount of output produced at time t and are emissions per unit of output. The evolution of M t is given by (Pindyck, 2000 (Pindyck, , 2002 :
is the rate of natural decay of the stock pollutant over time, i.e., a fraction of the pollutant in the atmosphere di¤uses into the ocean, forests, etc. In our model a policy involves a one-time reduction in t . Denote by i the unknown adoption time of the new environmental policy i and assume that the dynamics of M t changes after i :
Here, superscripts N and A indicate the state of no-adoption and adoption of the new environmental policy, respectively. Until a policy is adopted t stays at the constant initial level N , while policy adoption implies a once-and-for-all reduction to a new permanent level A ; with 0 A < N . Therefore, when the environmental regulator implements the new environmental policy, the level of emission ‡ow is reduced by N A8 . In the next section we endogenously determine N and A by solving the …rm's pro…t maximization problem under taxes and …xed quotas.
The …rm' s problem
Given the unknown adoption time of the new environmental policy, the …rm has to decide about output production. The pro…t ‡ow in the absence of some policy intervention (for 0 < t < i ) is:
The value of E that maximizes the term within brackets is given by:
which leads to the following expression for N :
where:
and:
Pro…t maximization problem (3) allows us to determine the level of emissions t before the adoption of the new environmental policy:
Two environmental policy options will be considered here: the level of emission ‡ow can be reduced either by setting a per-unit energy tax rate ( ) or a non-tradable quota for energy use ( E). To make a comparison between the e¤ect of taxes and quotas on the optimal adoption time, we suppose that, in the initial situation, energy use is the same under both regimes. Like van Soest (2005) 9 , let us assume that the environmental regulator has determined the Pigouvian tax ( ) that equates the marginal bene…ts and costs of pollution. The equivalent quota ( E) is assumed to be equal to the amount of energy that the …rm will employ, given this tax rate. It is obtained by solving the pro…t maximization problem under taxes: max E fpq(E) (z + ) Eg :Thus,
Using i (i = T; Q) to denote the policy regime i.e. taxes or non-tradable quotas, respectively, the …rm's pro…t ‡ow when the new environmental policy is adopted (for t i ) is:
where A T = (1 a)p 1/(1 a) (a /(z + ) ) a/(1 a) ;
and E is given by (6) 10 . Notice that the optimal level of E for i = T in (7) coincides with E. By (7) and (6) the level of emissions t after the adoption of the new environmental policy i can be obtained:
Note that emissions reduce to the same level A under both regimes. 9 See also Requate (1995) for further datails. 1 0 It is easy to show that A T < A Q for any > 0: This result still holds if we use the two inputs production function:
where L denotes the variable labour input and w is the cost per unit of input in L: According to Van Soest (2005), the instantaneous pro…t ‡ow can be calculated as:
The regulator' s problem
In each period the regulator is supposed to decide whether to adopt the new environmental policy i or to postpone it to the next period. Like Pindyck (2000 Pindyck ( , 2002 , we assume that the ‡ow of social costs (i.e. damages) associated with the stock variable M t has the quadratic form:
where X t is a variable that stochastically shifts over time to re ‡ect the damage due to the pollutant and is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion:
for constants < r; > 0: W t is a standard Brownian motion and r denotes the risk-free rate of interest. The process X t is assumed to capture economic uncertainty over future costs and bene…ts of policy adoptions. For example, changes in X t might re ‡ect the innovation of technologies that would reduce the damage from a pollutant, or demographic changes that would increase the social cost of M t . Let B (X t ; M t ) denote the net bene…t from emissions. If the regulator adopts the policy i, the net bene…t, is:
On the other hand, if the regulator never adopts the policy:
Let K N A be the cost of permanently reducing the emission ‡ows which is given by 11 :
E is calculated as: arg max E p E a L(E) b (z + ) E wL (E) and L (E) is the optimal amount of labour used as a function of energy input. 1 1 For simplicity, it is assumed that both instruments require the same gross investment cost (K) : 8 with k 1 ; k 2 0: This cost is assumed to be completely sunk.
The objective of the regulator is to choose the optimal timing of adopting policy i that would reduce emissions to A such that the expected net present value function (using the discount rate r) of the di¤erence between the net bene…t B (X t ; M t ) and the cost of policy adoption K N A , is maximized:
subject to Eq. (2) for the evolution of M t and Eq. (8) for the evolution of X t .
Here, T is the class of admissible implementation times relative to the …ltration generated by the stochastic process X t : Applying the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) methodology 12 , we can derive the optimal timing for the two environmental policies and the values to reduce emissions under the two environmental policies (see the Appendix). In particular, we can compute the two thresholds X i ,i = T; Q, such that it is optimal to adopt policy i for X > X i , with:
where 1 = r + 2 , 2 = r + , 3 = r , 1 is the positive solution to the standard characteristic equation and = ( N ; A ; M; 3 ). From a comparison between X T and X Q and between the two values of the option to reduce emissions we can get the following main results:
The optimal adoption threshold under taxes is larger than the adoption threshold under …xed quota for any > 0:
The value of the option to reduce emission under taxes is smaller than the value of the option to reduce emission under quota for any > 0:
Proof. of Propositions 1 and 2: in the Appendix.
Thus, Propositions 1 and 2 provide us with a ranking between taxes and non-tradable quotas in this setting, in a non equivocal way. It is found that non-tradable quota are more conducive to early adoption than taxes. Regulators may care about early adoption: in this case, non-tradable quotas outperform taxes, i.e. they should be the preferred policy instrument.
4 Optimal timing for the new environmental policies under ecological uncertainty and Choquet-Brownian ambiguity.
In this section, we study the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policies in the presence of ecological uncertainty and Choquet-Brownian motion representing ambiguity 13 . By ambiguity (or Knightian uncertainty) we mean the fact that information is too imprecise to be summarized adequately by probabilities, as is often the case in many decision-making settings characterized by unpredictability. It seems to be particularly appropriate in the analysis of the regulator's optimal environmental policies, where the set of beliefs expands and various scenarios of climate change, future costs and bene…ts from adopting new policies need to be considered. For the evolution of the stock of the environmental pollutant M t we follow Pindyck (2002) and assume that M t can be described by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, that is:
with 1 > 0 and W 1 t is a standard Brownian motion. The deterministic part of the process (11) is the same as before 14 .
To analyze the e¤ects of ambiguity on the value of adopting the environmental policies we adapt Kast, Lapied and Roubaud (2010) and assume that the regulator's beliefs are represented by "c ignorance", so that the new geometric Brownian motion for X t becomes 15 :
with m = 2c 1, s 2 = 4c(1 c) and c (0 < c < 1) is the constant conditional capacity which summarizes the regulator's attitude toward ambiguity. Indeed, this representation is consistent both with ambiguity aversion (c < 1 2 ) and an ambiguity lover regulator (c > 1 2 ) 16 . The absence of ambiguity (or simple 1 3 A Choquet-Brownian motion is a distorted Wiener process, where the distortion derives from the nature and intensity of preferences towards ambiguity (see Kast, Lapied and Roubaud, 2010, Section 2.2, for more details on the construction of Choquet-Brownian processes). 1 4 See Eq. (2) in Section 2 1 5 We follow Kast, Lapied and Roubaud (2010) for the derivation of the modi…ed process capturing economic uncertainty over future costs and bene…ts of policy adoptions. Speci…cally, let Xt follow a geometric Brownian motion: dXt = Xtdt + 2 XtdW 2 t ; in the absence of ambiguity. This is the same as for the process Xt in the previous section. Within the framework of ambiguity in continuous-time of Kast, Lapied and Roubaud (2010), Eq. (12) is obtained by dXt = Xtdt + 2 XtdW 2 t with dW 2 t = mdt + sdW 2 t ; where W 2 t is a standard Brownian motion with mean m = 2c 1 and variance s 2 = 4c(1 c): 1 6 For example, if the regulator is ambiguity averse c < 1 2 : Consequently, 0 < c < 1 2 implies 1 < m < 0 and 0 < s < 1; and then + m 2 < and 0 < s 2 < 2 : In other words, ambiguity aversion generates a reduction of the instantaneous mean and also of the volatility. 10 uncertainty) is included as a special case when c = 1 2 , so that m = 0 and s = 1. As usual, it is assumed that the no-bubble condition holds, where + m 2 < r: Moreover, 2 > 0 andW 2 t is a standard Brownian motion which is assumed to be independent of W 1 t , i.e. corr h W 1 t ;W 2 t i = 0. As in the previous section, the ‡ow of social costs associated with the stock variable M t is the quadratic form:
and the cost of permanently reducing the emission ‡ows is given by (9).
Optimal environmental policies
In this subsection, we discuss the solution for the optimal stopping problem (10) subject to Eq. (11) for the evolution of M t and Eq. (12) for the evolution of X t . In order to solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations analytically and to provide the further characterization of the value of adopting the environmental policies, it is assumed as in Pindyck (2002) that the pollutant stock has a zero natural decay rate (i.e. = 0) 17 . In other cases, numerical computations to solve the equations have to be performed.
Applying the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) methodology, we can derive the optimal timing for the two environmental policies and the values to reduce emissions under the two environmental policies (see the Appendix). In particular, in order to compare the e¤ects of taxes and quotas on the optimal timing for policy adoption in the presence of ecological uncertainty and Choquet-Brownian ambiguity, we can compute the two thresholds X T and X Q , such that it is optimal to adopt policy i for X > X i , as:
and is the positive solution ( > 1) to the standard characteristic equation. The following Proposition 3 provides the most comprehensive result and con…rms that quotas outperform taxes if early adoption is our concern: Proposition 3 In the presence of ecological uncertainty and Choquet-Brownian ambiguity: (1) the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is larger than the adoption threshold under …xed quota for any > 0, (2) the value of the option to reduce emission under taxes is smaller than the value of the option to reduce emission under quota for any > 0.
Proof. in the Appendix

Remark 4
In the special case when there is ecological uncertainty and noambiguity (i.e. when c = 1 2 ) the optimal stopping boundary X i (for i = T; Q), is given by:
( 1) ;
and the variable A i which enters the value option is given by: Note that this result is similar to Pindyck (2002) , although we consider the optimal timing of adopting two alternative environmental policies, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, while Pindyck (2002) considers the optimal timing for a single environmental policy adoption.
In the next section some numerical results and a sensitivity analysis are presented to deepen our understanding of the e¤ects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions and to analyze the e¤ects of a change in perceived ambiguity.
Numerical application
In this section we provide some numerical applications to the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policies in the presence of ecological uncertainty and ambiguity. The change in perceived ambiguity will be examined as a deviation from the base case (or neutral case) of c = 0:5, which describes absence of ambiguity. In order to implement the analytical solutions and study their sensitivity analysis with respect to important value drivers we use Mathematica Programming. We use as much as possible the same parameter values as in Pindyck (2002) and Van Soest (2005) . In particular, we assume that in the base case:
= 0 (drift-rate of economic uncertainty in the absence of ambiguity); r = 0:06 (risk-free interest rate); c = 0:5 (absence of ambiguity); 1 = 1:000:000 (volatility of ecological uncertainty); 2 = 0:05 (volatility of economic uncertainty in the absence of ambiguity); M = 10:000:000 (tons); k 1 = 1 (proportional cost); k 2 = 1:5 (adjustment cost); = 1 (emissions per unit of output); = 1 (energy e¢ ciency); a = 0:65 (output elasticity); p = 1 (price of output); z = 0:2 (cost of energy); = 0:1 (environmental tax). Figure 1 shows the relation between the critical threshold X i (M ) and the current pollutant stock M in the absence of ambiguity (i.e. when c = 1 2 ). The e¤ect of ecological uncertainty is investigated through two di¤erent curves. The dashed curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under taxes, X T (M ) ; with the current pollutant stock M , absent ambiguity, while the solid curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under quotas, X Q (M ) ; with the current pollutant stock M , absent ambiguity. We will consider current pollutant stock M in the range of 10 50 Million tons. As we would expect the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is greater than the adoption threshold under …xed quota. As in Pindyck (2002) , a larger M implies a larger social cost of environmental damage, and thus lower values of X at which it is optimal to adopt the policies. Figure 2 shows the relation between the critical threshold X i (M ) and the volatility 2 in the absence of ambiguity. The dashed curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under taxes with the volatility 2 absent ambiguity, while the solid curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under quotas with the volatility 2 absent ambiguity. We will consider values of the volatility 2 ranging from 0 to 1: As in Pindyck (2002) , increases of economic uncertainty over future payo¤s from reduced emissions increase the value of waiting, and raise the critical thresholds X T (M ) and X Q (M ) : Figure 3 shows the relation between the critical threshold X i (M ) and the tax rate in the absence of ambiguity. The dashed curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under taxes with the tax rate absent ambiguity, while the solid curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under quotas with the tax rate absent ambiguity. We will consider values of the tax rate ranging from 0 to 1: A larger a¤ects the net bene…t from reduced emissions and thus induces a larger optimal timing of adopting the environmental policies. Thus, more stringent environmental policies, measured in terms of higher tax rates, do not result in earlier adoption.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the e¤ect of ambiguity on the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policies. The dashed curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under taxes, X T (M ) ; with the degree of c-ignorance, while the solid curve illustrates the sensitivity of the critical threshold under quotas, X Q (M ) ; with the degree of c-ignorance. We will consider values of the degree of c-ignorance ranging from 0 to 1. A move down the interval ]0; 0:5[ for c so that m < 0, +m 2 decreases and $ increases, is associated with an increase in ambiguity aversion and, correspondingly, an increase in the thresholds, that is, the regulator cannot pin down the possible scenarios of changes in the future and therefore becomes more cautious than before. A move up the interval ]0:5; 1[ for c, so that m > 0, + m 2 increases and $ decreases, is associated with a more ambiguity lover regulator and, correspondingly, a decrease in the thresholds, that is, early adoption is stimulated. As in Kast, Lapied and Roubaud (2010) a larger c implies a lower value of the threshold X at which it is optimal to adopt the policies. In particular, an ambiguity averse environmental regulator (i.e. when 0 < c < 0:5) will delay the adoption of the new policies, while an ambiguity seeker regulator (i.e. when 0:5 < c < 1) will adopt them earlier than if he were ambiguity neutral (i.e. when c = 1 2 ). 
Conclusion
The choice of environmental policy instruments has been the object of a substantial amount of attention in the recent debate, both in the literature and for policy prescriptions. Our paper contributes to the debate by discussing the impact of alternative policy instruments, i.e. taxes and quotas, on the optimal timing of emission reductions. A main conclusion is that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than under quotas. Thus, in our model there is an unambiguous ranking of these policy instruments in terms of the adoption lags: if regulators wish to speed up the implementation of technologies reducing pollution emissions, then they may prefer quotas to taxes. This result is robust to various relevant parameters and changes in perceived ambiguity. Actually, a more stringent environmental policy, measured in terms of higher tax rates, further delays adoption. A more ambiguity averse regulator becomes more cautious in adopting the environmental policy options. Our sensitivity analysis provides a clue to regulators who are faced with environmental issues where economic costs and bene…ts cannot be forecasted and a lot of scenarios can be considered. Another alternative is to analyze the economic and policy consequences of catastrophic events (such as catastrophic climate change) and comprehensive damages, which should be fat tailed distributed, as Weitzman (2009) points out. Despite its adequacy to deal with extreme events, which are a realistic occurrence in environmental issues, a framework of fattailed cost bene…t analysis of climate change within the real option approach will be analytically untractable in general and require numerical methods.
[ 
Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
In this Appendix we derive the optimal timing for the environmental policy i. We solve the problem by stochastic dynamic programming. Let W N i = W N i (X; M ) denote the value function for the non-adopt region ( in which t = N ). The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is:
It has the following general solution: 
where A i1 and A i2 are unknowns to be determined, 1 = r+2 ; 2 = r+ ; and 3 = r : Here, 1 and 2 are the solution to the following characteristic equation:
and are given by:
The term between the squared parentheses in (13) is a particular solution, which captures the expected net bene…t from emissions in the case the environmental regulator has not adopted the policy and is calculated as 18 :
where N is given by (5) . Therefore, the parenthesis in (13) represents the fundamental term and the exponential terms account for the perpetual American option value. Next, let W A i = W A i (X; M ) denote the value function for the adopt region (in which t = A ). The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is:
When we consider a one-time reduction in t , there is no option term after pollutant emissions have been reduced to A ; so the solution for W A i (X; M ) is given by: 
20
where the right-hand side captures the expected discounted value of B A i (X t ; M t ) in the case the environmental regulator has adopted the policy i; and is calculated as:
We know that the solutions for W N i (X; M ) and W A i (X; M ) must satisfy the following set of boundary conditions (see Pindyck 2000 Pindyck , 2002 :
Here, X i (M ) is a free boundary, which must be found as part of the solution, and which separates the adopt from the no-adopt regions. It is also the solution to the stopping problem (10):
Given M; the policy i should be adopted the …rst time the process X t crosses the threshold X i (M ) from below. Boundary conditions (14) and (15) re ‡ect the fact that if X t is ever zero, it will remain at zero thereafter. Conditions (16) and (17) are the value matching and the smooth-pasting conditions, respectively. Conditions (14) and (15) imply:
Accordingly, we disregard the negative root in order to prevent the value from becoming in…nitely large when X t tends to 0; thus, we set A i2 = 0 (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . So (13) becomes:
21
The …rst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (18) is the value of the option to adopt policy i and reduce emissions to A , while the remaining terms represent the expected discounted value of B N (X t ; M t ) :
The value matching condition (16) can be rearranged in the following manner:
The smooth-pasting condition (17) yields:
Plugging (20) into (19), we get the expressions reproduced in Section 3:
Finally, substituting (21) into (20), we get:
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let us …nd a solution for the optimal stopping problem (10) subject to Eq. (11) for the evolution of M t and Eq. (12) for the evolution of X t . In this framework, the value function for the no-adopt region, W N i (X; M ) must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
and the value function for the adopt region, W A i (X; M ) ; must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
The solutions for W N i (X; M ) and W A i (X; M ) must satisfy the following set of boundary conditions:
W A i (0; M ) = 0;
where X i (M ) is the critical value of X at or above which the optimal environmental policies should be adopted. From now on, let us suppose for simplicity that the pollutant stock has a zero natural decay rate (i.e. = 0). We …rst calculate the expected discounted value of B N (X t ; M t ) and B A i (X t ; M t ): and:
where $ = (r ( + m 2 )) : Therefore, the solutions W N i (X; M ) and W A i (X; M ) are given by:
where G i (M ) = A i e M , w A i = A i e M X is the homogeneous solution to the partial di¤erential equation (22) and G i (M )X is the value of the option to adopt policy i and reduce emissions to A .
Here, and are the solutions to the following characteristic equation:
which need to be found, together with A i and X i (M ) using the boundary conditions (23)- (27) . Boundary condition (25) implies:
The smooth-pasting condition (26) yields:
and …nally the smooth-pasting condition (27) yields:
Plugging (31) into (30) and after some algebra, we …nd:
Then we plug (31) into (29) and obtain:
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By substituting (32) into (30), we obtain:
To …nd we plug into (28) and solve the equation for . By the standard real options argument must be larger than 1. Setting = N + A + M $; straightforward calculation yields: 
